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Enthusiasm, Interest, and Youth Club Activities After Stalin 
 At the 1956 Twentieth Communist Party Congress, A. N. Shelepin, the First Secretary of 
the Komsomol, the mass Soviet youth organization, criticized the Komsomol for being “slow to 
add new and interesting content to work with Komsomol members,” which “naturally, cannot 
satisfy young people.” He likewise called for “developing initiative and grassroots activism.”i 
My presentation explores these new post-Stalin notes in official cultural policy through the lens 
of novel youth-oriented cultural collectives known as interest-based clubs (kluby po interesu).ii  
My data shows that enthusiasm emerged as a key public emotion in the mid-1950s, the 
early years of the “Thaw,” the term for the decade and a half following Stalin’s death in 1953.iii 
My findings contribute to the budding historiography on emotions in Soviet history.iv Likewise, I 
posit that the post-Stalin tropes in official discourse regarding the soliciting of initiative from 
below represent the revival, in a new form, of the debates within the Party from the pre-
revolutionary years on spontaneity versus consciousness. This theme refers to the widespread 
disagreements over whether to rely on a populist approach to constructing communism that 
appealed to and gradually built up support among the masses for a moderate and evolutionary 
path, or a more coercive, top-down strategy of leadership by an ideologically conscious vanguard 
that pursued a more radical and revolutionary course. The literature on this subject has focused 
on the pre-revolutionary and early Soviet years, virtually ignoring what I argue was a shift from 
the extreme emphasis on consciousness under Stalin to a more balanced position afterward.v  
This balance, I suggest, comes through clearly in the interest-based clubs. On one hand, 
instead of simply dictating from above what young people should be interested in as did the 
Stalin authorities, post-Stalin official discourse pivoted toward proclaiming the need to fit and 
appeal to really-existing youth interests and wants. On the other hand, the Khrushchev 
authorities still aimed to use interest-based clubs as a means of directing and thus reshaping the 
interests of young people. Through doing so, the Kremlin strove to reforge youth identities, their 
senses of self, into those of New Soviet People, model subjects ready to build communism.vi  
… 
In the mid-1950s, the Komsomol Central Committee proposed creating a wide variety of 
innovative cultural collectives managed by young people, most notably youth clubs.vii Youth 
clubs harked back to NEP-era Komsomol-managed clubs. They formed part of a broader Thaw-
era search for a “Leninist” path to communism that sought to avoid Stalinist stains.viii  
A crucial difference between interest-based clubs and the Stalin-era hobby circles 
stemmed from the stress on youth activism and initiative in the interest-based clubs. An adult 
leader organized and directed a circle’s activities. Circles also had a patently didactic purpose, 
often featuring a program of instruction. They functioned only as part of a bigger cultural 
establishment, with no independent organizational status or budget. In contrast, young interest-
based club members themselves took charge of the club’s organization and governance, though 
within the limits defined by oversight institutions.  Likewise, the interest-based clubs had less 
educational elements, placing more emphasis on uniting rather than teaching participants. 
Additionally, interest-based clubs had an autonomous budget and status, not being dependent on 
any given cultural establishment. They could affiliate with any institution willing to give them a 
space to meet. An interview with B. G. Pshenichner, an official in Moscow’s Pioneer Palace who 
worked with circles and interest-based clubs dedicate to astronomy and aeronautics from the 
Thaw era on, further illuminates the differences. When I asked him to compare circles and clubs, 
he stated that clubs had an element of self-management, more autonomy, and less bureaucracy.ix  
The Komsomol leadership expressed broad encouragement for these clubs. For instance, 
the Komsomol Central Committee in 1956 advocated for the widespread creation of “clubs for 
stamp collecting, photography, radios, and clubs of young women and older school children” as 
a means of dealing with the continuing Stalin-era problems in Komsomol work.x With such 
support, interest-based clubs spread throughout the Soviet Union in the mid- and late 1950s. In 
1967, 12,000 youth clubs, which included interest-based clubs, functioned in the USSR.xi Youth 
clubs had anywhere from several dozen to several hundred members, and thus total membership 
in 1967 likely ranged from half a million to a million youth. Thus, from the Thaw onward, many 
millions among the young participated in such cultural collectives. 
Interest-based clubs targeted a much wider range of activities than Stalin-era hobby 
circles. Exemplifying the variety of such clubs, the Komsomol’s plan to construct a Youth Palace 
in Moscow included many rooms for clubs dedicated to specific interests: photography, movies, 
radio, music, tourism, fishing and hunting, keeping pigeons, collecting stamps, cars, technology, 
aeronautics, gardening, and an international club.xii In Kemerovo chess, tourist, and photography 
clubs expanded the range of cultural activities for youth. These clubs also contributed to the 
varied duties of the Komsomol. The photography clubs created photo displays and produced 
satirical newspapers. All created using voluntary initiative, such production decreased financial 
outlays.xiii L’viv had a “Club for Artistic Youth,” and Dniepropetrovsk a “Club for Creative 
Youth.”xiv Nature protection clubs began to appear.xv International clubs emerged.xvi  
Satisfying youth desires and appealing to their interests served as a primary goal of these 
clubs for the authorities. Increasing the amount of time that youth spent in officially-monitored 
contexts constituted another key aim. So did developing youth activism and community 
leadership. Besides these overarching benefits, the hierarchy perceived specific interest-based 
clubs as providing a wide variety of additional benefits. For instance, the authorities intended 
aeronautics, automobile, technology and similar clubs to promote youth knowledge about and 
interest in a needed profession; nature, hunting, and fishing clubs endeavored to advance military 
preparation and fitness; music and film clubs sought to spread normative cultural standards; 
photography clubs contributed to propaganda; international clubs increased knowledge about the 
world and promoted international ties, improving the Soviet image abroad in the Cold War.   
Interest-based clubs aimed at various social demographics also emerged, and marked an 
even bigger break from the Stalin years by bringing together youth to enjoy the company of 
others who presumably shared similar interests, with no direct Stalinist equivalents. The plan for 
Moscow’s Youth Palace included clubs for college students, young women, and older school 
students (starsheklassniki), those in seventh through tenth grades aged approximately fourteen to 
seventeen.xvii  
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The latter received particular support in a Komsomol Central Committee 1956 resolution that 
highlighted the need to create clubs for older school students to hold “evenings of song, dancing, 
movie festivals, various debates, meetings with scientists, writers, and artists, exemplary 
workers, sport activities, and other events.” It underscored that “the students themselves need to 
bear responsibility for the organizational work in the club,” with supervision from official Party-
state bodies and involvement by parents, teachers, cultural officials, college students, and 
others.xviii These clubs for older school students thus combined grassroots community leadership, 
satisfaction of youth interests, spreading cultural enlightenment, and instilling health and fitness 
with getting school-age youngsters into collective spaces.  
Clubs for young women also sprang up. A 1956 front-page article in the national 
Komsomol organ both commended the successful start-up of a club for young women in a Minsk 
factory and, since it appeared so prominently, served as one of many signals from above to 
spread such establishments across the board.  
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This club created sections devoted to dancing, photography, sewing and crocheting, and folk 
musical instruments. It planned to organize events with the titles “How to Dress Simply and 
Well” and “Evening for Young Mothers.” The club’s activities also uplifted high-performing 
young women workers. The journalist highlighted in particular how such clubs helped young 
women who got married stay involved in collective activities, and also made clear that young 
women themselves took charge over such clubs.xix Thus, in addition to the overarching benefits 
of interest-based clubs, clubs for young women had the addiotional benefit of keeping young 
married women involved in organized cultural recreation after marriage, also teaching them 
appropriate fashion norms and the child-rearing and home-keeping skills seen as necessary for 
young women. 
These clubs bring out the nuanced gender implications of young women’s lives in the 
Thaw. The historiography has highlighted how the Khrushchev leadership reopened the “woman 
question” by publicly acknowledging and endeavoring to assist women with the “double burden” 
of working outside the home and undertaking domestic and childrearing chores. The Khrushchev 
administration did so by supporting collective social services, such as crèches, and also calling 
on men to do more to help and express respect for women, with some limited success.xx I suggest 
that the official discourse on organized recreation suggests that young married women in 
particular bore a “triple burden.” The post-Stalin rhetoric called upon them not only to work hard 
and to keep the house and raise children, but also to engage in community activism through 
collective cultural activities – these three elements defined the model gender roles of New Soviet 
Young Women in the Thaw. Clubs for young women both encouraged women to take on all 
aspects of these gender roles, and supported women in carrying them out.  
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Interest-based clubs shine a light on the enactment of the new and more loose Thaw-era 
emotional regime at the ground level of youth cultural life. William Reddy used the term 
“emotional regime” to refer to the emotional norms of expression and experience propounded by 
those in charge at any given time. He envisioned emotional regimes on a spectrum from loose to 
strict, with the latter referring to ones with tightly bounded and closely managed affective norms, 
whose violation drew harsh disciplining.
xxiii
xxi State-sponsored popular culturexxii reoriented 
drastically after 1953 to appeal much more to the reality of youth interests and solicit initiative 
from below, all with an eye toward inspiring grassroots enthusiasm for the Soviet project.   
I propose that the widespread youth engagement in interest-based clubs indicates 
significant success on the part of the authorities in placing enthusiasm at the heart of the Soviet 
emotional community in the Thaw. Confirming this trend, other areas of organized cultural 
recreation also experienced rapid growth in the Thaw.xxiv Furthermore, other scholarship also 
points to the explosive growth of enthusiasm and optimism in many areas of Soviet society.xxv  
Certainly, far from all Soviet youth chose to dedicate extensive time and energy to 
interest-based clubs and other forms of organized cultural recreation. Some preferred to spend 
their time and express their passions in other settings, including non-state ones.xxvi Furthermore, 
the Khrushchev authorities did not endorse the full range of actually-existing youth interests. 
Instead, the top officials chose only those perceived as having some potential benefits.  
Likewise, in some cases interest-based clubs had the potential to hold activities that did 
not conform fully with top-level intentions. For instance, certain clubs devoted to collecting 
stamps and coins hosted illegal trade in these valuable objects between members.xxvii
xxviii
 Some 
international clubs received official criticism for inadequate monitoring of contacts with 
outsiders.  L. V. Guseva, a librarian at Saratov State University who ran a science fiction 
club, told me that the club occasionally discussed some pieces distributed in self-published 
(samizdat) form that failed to go through official censorship.xxix Only rarely did the authorities 
actually close clubs, usually when these explicitly challenged the boundaries. For instance, the 
authorities banned a club for poets after it staged an exhibit of abstract art.xxx Dniepropetrovsk’s 
“Club for Creative Youth” was shut due to suspicions that the club promoted Ukrainian 
nationalism.xxxi 
Owing to the top-level emphasis on satisfying youth interests and inspiring initiative from 
below, some degree of unsanctioned activities was inevitable in the interest-based club 
movement. However, most instances of nonconformism, at least those that did not lead to the 
exceedingly rare closures of clubs, in part contributed to the stability and legitimacy of the Party-
state. The authorities succeeded in getting young people to spend their time within official 
settings and satisfied youth desires to express opinions and undertake activities at some variance 
from prescribed ones. If youngsters lacked such officially-sanctioned outlets, their 
nonconformism could potentially have expressed itself in a much more destabilizing fashion and 
resulting in significant alienation from the Soviet system.  
Overall, the multitude of Soviet youth whose interests and passions fit within the much-
expanded and genuine grassroots orientation of post-Stalin policy experienced a substantial 
improvement in their everyday cultural life. The new approach worked well for bringing the 
official emotional regime closer to young people’s actual emotions, getting many youth who 
were excluded and alienated under Stalin into the overarching Soviet emotional community. This  
is a term deployed by Barbara Rosenwein to refer to a group whose members follow shared 
norms of emotional expression and possess the same affective outlooks.xxxii
xxxiii
xxxiv
 Cynicism and 
disillusionment arguably decreased while enthusiasm and joy grew, improving youth lives 
overall.  It thus seems reasonable to postulate that the gap between young people and the 
authorities that grew wide in the late Stalin years shrunk significantly in the early Thaw.   
No wonder, then, that many young people chose enthusiastically to go along with the 
official post-Stalin guidelines regarding state-sponsored popular culture. These youth exhibited 
what I term “conformist agency,” namely the conscious and willing decision, stemming 
primarily from one’s internal motivations as opposed to external pressure, to act in ways that 
follow official guidelines closely.
xxxvi
xxxv Such conclusions add to the scholarship on post-Stalin 
youth and popular culture, which has cast much-needed light on the small numbers of youth 
involved in public countercultural activities, but has not paid sufficient attention to the brunt of 
youth who did not engage in public nonconformism, leaving their lives in the shadows.   
At the same time, the Party-state cultural policy aimed to co-opt youth interests to 
achieve officially-prescribed goals. My interviews with Pschenichner and N. V. Kozlova, who 
also worked with him in Moscow’s Pioneer Palace, reveal this well.  Kozlova related that the 
activities in the Palace aimed to utilize a young person’s enthusiasm for space both for education 
and for moral upbringing (vospitanie): in her own words, “to use his interest in this field to 
influence him.”xxxvii
xxxviii
 Pshenichner, in parallel to Kozlova, underlined the functionality of interest-
based clubs to “direct the activism of young people into appropriate channels.”  Similar 
goals and outcomes characterized a broad range of interest-based clubs at the Pioneer Palace.xxxix  
… 
 The tensions between spontaneity and consciousness dating back to the pre-revolutionary 
years continued to impact Soviet society throughout the history of the USSR. The late Stalinist 
administration adopted a radically consciousness-oriented approach in its youth policy, 
demanding strict discipline from young people and making disingenuous Socialist Realist claims 
that the interests and preferences of Soviet youth matched its idealized model of ideological 
militancy, orientation toward production, and xenophobic nationalism.xl  The Khrushchev 
leadership moved away from that position and toward a more balanced approach closer to the 
spontaneity end of the spectrum by seeking to inspire youth grassroots initiative and appeal to 
young people’s interests. The post-Stalin leadership’s change in course served to move 
enthusiasm to the heart of the Thaw-era emotional regime. The overarching goal of the new 
administration consisted of getting the population engaged in the Khrushchev-era revival of the 
campaign to progress toward communism through further transforming society. Having young 
people experience a strong emotional affinity – enthusiasm – for this aim constituted an 
important element of the broader drive. Less overtly, the Khrushchev leadership also hoped to 
secure greater legitimacy for itself through fulfilling popular youth desires.  
 In comparison to the late Stalin years, substantially more youngsters showed conformist 
agency by participating enthusiastically in state-sponsored popular culture during the Thaw. 
Plenty also welcomed the new opportunity to take on significant community leadership roles 
within the cultural sphere. Such youth activism attests to the achievements of the Khrushchev 
authorities in sparking grassroots enthusiasm for organized cultural recreation. The post-Stalin 
liberalizing policies transformed not only the emotional regime, but also the reality of the Soviet 
emotional community, making enthusiasm for building communism a part of everyday life for 
many, who saw this process as in accordance with their own personal interests and aspirations.  
  While my conclusions underscore the significant degree of cooperation and mutual 
benefits between the governing structures and mainstream youth resulting from the Khrushchev 
administration’s shift in its youth cultural policy toward spontaneity, the cultural authorities 
certainly maintained distinct elements of consciousness in their approach to socially engineering 
Soviet society. Officials strove not only to appeal to and satisfy young people, but also to guide 
their interests and eagerness for community involvement into channels perceived as conducive to 
building a communist society and reforging youth identities into those of the Thaw-era version of 
New Soviet People. Interest-based clubs and other forms of state-sponsored popular culture 
functioned to occupy youth leisure time with prescribed collective activities, as well as fulfilling 
a variety of pragmatic functions such as professional preparation, cultural enlightenment, 
ensuring military readiness and fitness, and decreasing financial burdens on the Party-state.  
 The Soviet reforms bore similarities to other socialist states. For instance, already in 
1948, after Josip Tito broke with Stalin, the Yugoslavian Party-state began to promote initiative 
from below and the need to appeal to actual youth interests, further supporting the importance of 
de-Stalinization in bringing about these developments. This similarity likewise illustrates that the 
tension between the values of consciousness and spontaneity had widescale relevance across the 
broader socialist sphere.xli Other socialist states, such as East Germany, Bulgaria, and Hungary, 
promoted grassroots initiative and appeasing authentic youth cultural interests following Stalin’s 
demise, frequently following changes in the hard-line leaderships backed by Stalin.xlii On the one 
hand, these parallels highlight the importance of the top officials changing their approach to the 
cultural sphere in shaping youth everyday cultural life. On the other hand, the authorities in each 
case aimed to fit genuinely popular interests and desires, illustrating that the change in course 
actually followed from and responded to the citizenry and its needs and preferences. In effect, 
the socialist governing authorities after Stalin negotiated with the population to create a more 
pluralistic mass cultural system. This system both enabled ruling bodies to achieve their goals 
through socially engineering the populations while also accommodating to the population’s real 
desires and interests and convincing the citizenry that they can have a personally meaningful and 
enjoyable lifestyle and experience of socialism. Despite the multitude of other problems within 
socialist states, the post-Stalin transformations in Soviet and eastern European state-sponsored 
popular cultures helped ensure the long-term stability of these systems. 
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